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Preserving Power Without Sacrificing Justice:
Creating an Effective Reciprocity Regime for
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments
VISHALI SINGAL*

INTRODUCTION

The image exemplifying the way in which globalization has swept
the twenty-first century is familiar-a businessman sitting helplessly on
his cell phone staring at his laptop screen in his San Francisco apartment
while he listens to the Indian accent of a computer whiz in a Bangalore,
India call center on the other end of the line and watches her mouse
navigate its way on his laptop through an Internet connection to fix the
problem. Given the magnitude of interaction between countries, either
through private commerce, foreign relations between governments, or
the treatment of one nation's citizens by another nation, the world's legal
systems have become interconnected as well. Whether the laws of one
nation dispense justice in accordance with that nation's standards is now,
in many circumstances, dependent upon whether the laws of another
nation will recognize and enforce foreign judgments. As such, the
strength of the American legal system is predicated in part upon the
world's receptivity to American judgments, which in turn is influenced by
America's receptivity to foreign judgments.
American case law presents a compelling picture of the interactions
between nations in this era of globalization and the resulting
interconnectedness of the world's legal systems. The following cases
illustrate this interconnectedness. In 1973, Jack Kough, a minority
shareholder of British Columbian corporation Arvee Cedar Mills, Ltd.
("Arvee"), and Merlin William Thompson, entered into an agreement
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, U.C. Hastings College of the Law; M.A. Candidate, 2009, City and
Regional Planning, UC Berkeley; B.A., 2003, Architecture, U.C. Berkeley. Thank you to Professor
David Levine for his continued guidance and editing throughout this process, Professor Geoffrey
Hazard for his insight, and Professor William Dodge, who suggested this research topic. Thank you
also to my mother Sudesh, my father Surender, brother Suneet, and friends Sukie Dhami and Rina
Shah for their love and support.
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with the Bank of Montreal ("the Bank"), requiring the Bank to continue
engaging in business transactions with Arvee in exchange for Kough and
Thompson's promise to repay $718,000 in debt, plus interest from the
date the Bank demanded payment.' In 1975, the Bank brought suit
against Kough for breach of contract in the Supreme Court of British
Columbia, the "province's superior trial court,"' alleging that Kough and
Thompson were jointly and severally liable for $842,000 under the
contract.3 Kough failed to appear in the British Columbian action after
the Bank served him personally with notice in California.' Consequently,
the Supreme Court of British Columbia rendered a default judgment
against Kough' After the Bank sought recognition and enforcement of
the Canadian judgment i9i the United States, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California held that the Canadian judgment
would be recognized "in the absence of any of the other grounds for nonrecognition" listed in the California Code of Civil Procedure.6
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's recognition of the
Canadian judgment, rejecting Kough's reliance upon a reciprocity
defense that "British Columbia would refuse to recognize a default
judgment rendered against one of its citizens in the United States under
similar circumstances.. . ." In so doing, the Ninth Circuit noted that the

drafters of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of
1962, incorporated into the California Code of Civil Procedure, had
purposefully omitted reciprocity as a defense to the recognition of a
foreign money judgment "on the ground that the due process concepts
embodied in the [Recognition] Act were an adequate8 safeguard for the
rights of citizens sued on judgments obtained abroad.,
Ten years after the Ninth Circuit decided Bank of Montreal, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a decision by the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas not to recognize a foreign
money judgment stemming from an overdraft agreement.9 A French
bank ("the French Bank"), operating a branch office in Abu Dhabi, had
brought suit against Hanna Elias Khreich, who formerly resided in Abu
Dhabi but became a naturalized American citizen and a Texas resident."
The French Bank sought to recover 200,000 dirhams that Khreich
i. Bank of Montreal v. Jack Kough, 612 F.2d 467,468 ( 9 th Cir. i98O).
2. Courts of British Columbia, B.C. Supreme Court Home Page, http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/sc/
(last visited Mar. 17, 2007).
3. Kough, 612 F.2d at 468-69.

4. Id. at 469.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 469-70.
7. Id. at 471.
8. Id. at 471-72.
9. See Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d iooo, 1002-03 (5th Cir. I99o).
Io.Id. at xooI.
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allegedly owed to it, filing suit in U.S. district court." Meanwhile,
Khreich sued the French Bank in Abu Dhabi for the Bank's alleged
breach of an agreement with Khreich, and filed a motion to dismiss the
French Bank's lawsuit in district court. After the Abu Dhabi court
returned a judgment in the Bank's favor, the Bank sought to enforce the
Abu Dhabi judgment in district court as precluding Khreich's motion to
dismiss." The district court refused to recognize the Abu Dhabi
judgment on two grounds: Abu Dhabi did not recognize U.S. or Texas
judgments, and 3Abu Dhabi lacked "procedures compatible with due
process of law."'
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision, finding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in refiusing to recognize the Abu
Dhabi judgment. 4 Applying Texas law to determine whether the district
court properly refused to recognize the Abu Dhabi judgment, the Fifth
Circuit noted that the Texas Recognition Act treats non-reciprocity as a
discretionary ground for non-recognition.'5 Specifically, the Texas
Recognition Act states:
A foreign country judgment need not be recognized if . . . it is

established that the foreign country in which the judgment was
rendered does not recognize judgments rendered in this state that, but
for the fact that they are rendered in this state,
conform to the
6
definition of "foreign country judgment."
The Fifth Circuit determined that the district court properly treated
an affidavit by an American attorney practicing in Abu Dhabi, stating
that he and other members of his firm were "unaware of any Abu Dhabi
courts enforcing United States' judgments," as sufficient evidence of
non-reciprocity.' 7 Although Abu Dhabi law permits the recognition of
foreign judgments in the court's discretion and although the American
attorney was "unaware of any actual attempts to enforce such
judgments" in Abu Dhabi, the attorney expressed concern as to whether
Abu Dhabi courts would choose to recognize an American judgment."
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to recognize the Abu Dhabi judgment.'9
Together these cases provide a small glimpse into the globalization
phenomenon that has swept the world as early as the 1970s-as subtle as
ii.
12.

Id. at 1002.
See id. at 1003.

13. Id.
14. See id. at lOO6.
15. See id. at 1004.
i6. Id. at 1004 n.3 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)( 7 ) (Vernon 1986 &
Supp. 1990)).
17. Id. at 1005.
18. Id. at I005-o6.
19. Id. at I006.
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an American citizen engaging in business transactions with neighboring
country Canada and as complex as a contract and lawsuit involving
entities and persons from three different regions of the world, such as a
European bank, a North American citizen, and a Middle Eastern court.
As modern technologies in transportation and communication create
opportunities for individuals, businesses, and government entities to
cross paths throughout the world at a rate higher than the world has ever
experienced, the law has naturally been evolving to keep up. The law is
only a catalyst for achieving justice if courts' judgments can be enforced
against an individual, entity, or assets. As such, litigants throughout the
world cannot always rest easy after winning favorable judgments.
Instead, they must ensure that the judgments are enforced in those
countries in which the judgment debtor, the losing party, resides or in
which the judgment debtor's assets sit. Moreover, other circumstances
might prompt a judgment creditor, the winning party, to initiate an
enforcement proceeding in a country different from where the judgment
was rendered. Such circumstances are illustrated in Khreich, where the
French bank sought to enforce the Abu Dhabi judgment to preclude
Khreich's claim against it in a U.S. court.
In theory, a nation's recognition and enforcement law has the
power to influence whether private parties will receive remedies for the
harms they have suffered. When nations refuse to recognize and enforce
judgments of other nations, private parties face the grueling task of relitigating the case in a new jurisdiction if the party, as plaintiff, chooses to
continue pursuing a remedy or if the party, as defendant, is subject to a
new lawsuit in the new jurisdiction. Private parties' success in a
subsequent lawsuit hinges partly, if not significantly, on the availability of
time and money. Additionally, the treatment one nation affords to
judgments rendered in other nations may impact how its own judgments
are treated.
As exemplified by Bank of Montreal and Khreich, the United States
lacks a unified approach to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, creating complexities (and confusion) for a foreign plaintiff
attempting to collect on a foreign judgment in the United States. While
the district court easily recognized the Canadian judgment in Bank of
Montreal by applying California's liberal recognition and enforcement
law, the district court in Khreich just as easily refused to recognize the
20. Although an American court might not treat the recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment as separate steps, they have distinct meanings. An American court "recognizes" a foreign
judgment when "a forum court accepts the determination of legal rights and obligations made by the
rendering court in the foreign country" and "enforces" a foreign judgment when it applies legal
procedures "to ensure that the judgment debtor obeys the foreign-country judgment." UNIF. FOREIGNCOUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNMON ACr § 4, cmt. 2 (2005). A court's decision not to recognize a
foreign judgment constitutes a complete bar to recovery under that judgment.
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Abu Dhabi judgment by applying Texas' more conservative law. In the
United States, recognition and enforcement law has been reserved as an
issue of state law. While the majority of states have adopted the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act ("the Recognition Act")
since its original drafting in 1962, some have not and many others have
adopted laws that deviate slightly, but significantly, from the Recognition
Act. In 1998, the American Law Institute Council (AL) undertook the
task of nationalizing the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments by proposing a federal statute to govern the issue. In 2006, the
ALl released its proposed federal statute ("the Proposed Act") which
includes a reciprocity defense." Under the ALI's Proposed Act, if a
judgment debtor raises a reciprocity defense, a U.S. federal or state court
may only recognize a foreign judgment if the foreign country rendering
the judgment would recognize comparable U.S. judgments. The
Proposed Act was approved at the ALI's 2005 Annual Meeting."
This Note will analyze the ALI's Proposed Act, stemming from its
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Project, 3 in the
context of the reciprocity debate. Part I of this Note will detail the critical
historical developments in American recognition and enforcement
practice. Part II will compare American jurisprudence on recognition
and enforcement to international recognition and enforcement practices.
Part III will provide an analysis of the ALI's Proposed Act, focusing
specifically on the effectiveness of its reciprocity defense in encouraging
foreign countries to recognize and enforce American judgments. Finally,
Part IV will present an argument for modifying the Proposed Act by
eliminating the reciprocity defense for causes of action to enforce a
foreign judgment and retaining its modified bright-line reciprocal
agreement requirement in regards to the registration of foreign
judgments. Such a modification would preserve justice for private
litigants while encouraging foreign nations to recognize and enforce U.S.
judgments.
I. THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: UNCERTAINTY

While a plaintiff might receive a court's favorable judgment in a civil
action, he or she could be precluded from pronouncing victory by the
laws regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in

21. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 14-16 (2oo6) [hereinafter PROPOSED ACT].
22.

JUDGMENTS:

See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ACTIONS TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO DRAFTS SUBMITrED AT 2005

ANNUAL MEETING 15 (2005), https://www.ali.orglali/AMo5ActionsTaken.pdf.
23. This ALI project was previously titled the International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project.
See American Law Institute, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and
Proposed Federal Statute, http://www.ali.org/ali/IntlJuris-Proj.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
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the country in which he or she seeks to enforce the judgment. When an
individual brings a civil action to enforce a foreign judgment in the
United States, he or she is confronted with various approaches to the
recognition and enforcement of that particular judgment since each state
has unfettered discretion to shape its law on the issue. Additionally, an
individual holding a favorable American judgment must determine
whether the laws governing the recognition and enforcement of
American judgments in the country in which enforcement is sought stem
from federal or state law, statutes or common law, and bilateral or
multilateral treaties. The current complexities of international and U.S.
recognition and enforcement law have compelled the United States to
clarify, and present cohesively, recognition and enforcement law which
best protects the interests of its citizens. A historical and comparative
look into U.S. and international recognition and enforcement law lays
the groundwork for an analysis of this unified approach.
A.

REDEFINING AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE ON COMITY

In writing the "De Conflictu Legum," a comprehensive theory of
conflicts of law, Seventeenth Century Dutch jurist Ulrich Huber was
arguably the most influential scholar on the development of American
conflicts of law theory. 4 His "De Conflictu Legum" includes three
maxims which many legal scholars consider to be influential upon the
Anglo-American doctrine of territoriality of laws.25 Describing the force
of a sovereign's laws outside of its territory, Huber proclaimed in one
maxim: "Sovereigns will so act by way of comity that rights acquired
within the limits of a government retain their force everywhere so far as
they do not cause prejudice to the power or rights of such government or
of its subjects. ,"6
Huber acknowledged a sovereign's right to reject application of
foreign law within its own territory. 7 However, he also recognized that
[a]lthough the laws of one country can have no direct force in another
country ... nothing could be more inconvenient to the commerce and
general intercourse of nations than that transactions valid by the law of
one place should be rendered of no effect elsewhere owing to a
difference in law.28

24. See James Weinstein, The Dutch Influence on the Conception of JudicialJurisdiction in 19th
Century America, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 73, 74-75 (199O).

25. See Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualificationsand the Conflict of Laws, 20 COLUM. L.
REV. 247, 272 (1920).

26. Id. (quoting Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REv. 375, 403
(1919)).
27. See Susan L. Stevens, Note, Commanding InternationalJudicial Respect: Reciprocity and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. i5, 1I9
(2002).
28. Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionat a Crossroads:An Intersection Between Public
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Centuries ahead of his time, Huber's words evince the realities of
the twenty-first century-a network of independent sovereigns
interlinked on a day-to-day basis. The doctrine of comity, introduced by
Huber as "courtesy" between nations, "'involving... mutual recognition
of [their] legislative, executive and judicial acts,"' 9 advanced the
principle of sovereignty while alleviating the inconvenience created by
invalidating transactions in another nation simply because they were
subject to a different body of law.
Huber's doctrine of comity influenced American jurist Joseph Story
such that it entered Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws
("Commentaries").3" After the Commentaries were accepted by England
and the United States, and following persurisive English decisions by
Lord Mansfield adopting comity, the doctrine naturally embedded itself
in American jurisprudence.3
In 1895, the doctrine was radically altered in the United States and
never quite found stable footing again. That year, in the infamous case of
Hilton v. Guyot,32 the Supreme Court redefined comity, and in so doing,
destabilized U.S. recognition and enforcement law. In Hilton, a French
partnership brought suit in the United States to enforce its favorable
judgment against an American partnership because the American
partnership had liquidated its business assets in France during French
litigation proceedings.33 Turning to the doctrine of comity, Justice Gray
famously remarked:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.34
Justice Gray conditioned the exercise of comity to recognize and
enforce a foreign judgment on whether: (i) both parties had an
"opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad"; (2) the trial was before a
court of "competent jurisdiction"; (3) the defendant was afforded due
and Private InternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 282 (1982).
29. Stevens, supra note 27, at 119 (quoting Joel R. Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARV.
INT'L L.J. I, 15 (199)).
30. See N. Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of International
Parallel Proceedings,27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 601, 619 (2oo6); see also Maier, supra note 28, at 283
(discussing Story's idea of comity from Huber's writings).
31. See Calamita, supra note 3o; Maier, supra note 28, at 283 n.8 (citing Lord Mansfield's
decisions in Robinson v. Bland, 2 Bur. 1077, 1 W.B1. 234, 259 (176o), and Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 1
Cowp. 341).
32. I59 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1895).

33. See id. at 115-16.
34. Id. at 163-64.
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notice
appeared before the court; (4) the proceedings were
"underor avoluntarily
system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice"; (5) the proceedings were not tainted by fraud
or prejudice; and (6) no other special reason precluded the enforcement
and recognition of the foreign judgment.35 Justice Gray, however, did not
render a judgment based on these criteria, which he noted followed
judicial trends in the United States and England and the lead of
Chancellor Kent and Justice Story. 6 Instead, Justice Gray proclaimed:
[T]here is a distinct and independent ground upon which we are
satisfied that the comity of our nation does not require us to give
conclusive effect to the judgments of the courts of France; and that
ground is, the want of reciprocity, on the part of France, as to the effect
to be given to the judgments of this and other foreign countries.37
France's refusal to recognize and enforce American and other
foreign judgments was the basis for the Court's refusal to give conclusive
effect to the French judgment?8 With the stroke of a pen, Justice Gray
introduced a reciprocity requirement into U.S. recognition and
enforcement law that was vigorously opposed by four justices in dissent.39
Although reciprocity was not alien to countries around the world, its
introduction in the United States turned U.S. recognition and
enforcement law on its head.
B.

UNPREDICTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE UNIFORM FOREIGN

MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT AND THE RESTATEMENTS

While the Hilton decision created a dramatic change in ideology
behind U.S. recognition and enforcement law, the change was shortlived. In 1926, the New York Court of Appeals, in Johnston v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,limited Hilton's reach in observing
that state courts "will recognize private rights acquired under foreign
laws."'4 Twelve years later, the Hilton reciprocity requirement was
weakened yet again. In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,4 ' the Supreme
Court held that general federal common law does not exist, and that
federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the substantive laws of the
states in which they sit." Consequently, federal courts sitting in diversity
reject reciprocity as a condition to the recognition and enforcement of a

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at

202-03.

Id. at
Id. at

202.

210 (emphasis added).
See id.
See id. at 229-34 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
152 N.E. 121 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1926).
41. 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938).
42. Id.; see also Katherine R. Miller, Note, PlaygroundPolitics:Assessing the Wisdom of Writing a
Reciprocity Requirement into US. InternationalRecognition and Enforcement Law, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L.
239, 251 (2004)

(discussing the effects of Erie on the Hilton doctrine).
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foreign judgment if the applicable state law rejects reciprocity.43
Today, Hilton's demise is reflected in three sources, the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws, and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations.'
i.
The Uniform ForeignMoney-Judgments Recognition Act
The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, adopted
in 1962 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, has been enacted by at least thirty-one states as of 2005."5 The
Recognition Act was revised in 2005 and renamed the Uniform ForeignCountry Money Judgments Recognition Act. The Recognition Act
requires that at a minimum, a foreign money-judgment be "final,
conclusive and enforceable" under the law of the foreign country where
rendered to be recognized. 46 The Recognition Act delineates two sets of
defenses to recognition-mandatory and discretionary. Under the
"mandatory" defenses, a foreign judgment may not be recognized if the
foreign court system: (i) suffers from partiality or deprives litigants of
due process; (2) lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or (3)
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant.47 The
"discretionary" defenses permit a court to refuse recognition if: (i) the
defendant in the original proceeding did not receive adequate notice; (2)
the judgment was procured through fraud; (3) the judgment or cause of
action is "repugnant" to the state's or United States' public policy; (4)
the judgment creates conflict with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the court proceedings conflicted with the parties' agreement for
dispute resolution; (6) the foreign court constituted a seriously
inconvenient forum where jurisdiction was based solely on personal
service; (7) circumstances surrounding the judgment raise substantial
doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the
foreign-country judgment; or (8) the specific proceedings leading to the
foreign-country judgment were inconsistent with the requirements of due
43. See Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In
Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 253, 262 (I99i); see also
Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d IOOO, 1002-03 (5th Cir. 199o) ("Since the
jurisdiction of this court is based on diversity of citizenship, we apply Texas law regarding the
recognition of foreign country money-judgments."); Somportex, Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp.,
453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971) ("[B]ecause our jurisdiction is based solely on diversity, 'the law to be
applied.., is the law of the state,' in this case, Pennsylvania law .... Pennsylvania distinguishes
between judgments obtained in the courts of her sister states, which are entitled to full faith and credit,
and those of foreign courts, which are subject to principles of comity." (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 78)).
44. See Stevens, supra note 27, at 127-28.
45. See John A. Spanogle, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the U.S. -A Matter of State
Law in Federal Courts, 13 U.S.-MEx. L. J. 85, 87 (2oo5).
46. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTs RECOGNITION AcT, supra note 20, § 3(a)(2), 4(A).
The 2005 Recognition Act does not extend to non-monetary judgments, nor does it extend to
judgments regarding taxes, fines, penalties, or matrimonial and familial support. Id. § 3(b)(I)-(3).

47. See id. § 4(b)()-(3).
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process of law. 48 The seventh and eighth discretionary defenses were
added in the 2005 amendment of the Recognition Act.
While the Recognition Act was designed to "'create greater
recognition of the state's judgments in foreign nations... by informing
the foreign nations of particular situations in which their judgments
would definitely be recognized,"'49 scholars fear that the Recognition Act
has failed, and will continue to fail, to secure foreign countries'
confidence in U.S. recognition and enforcement law. The Recognition
Act in its current form will not encourage foreign countries to be more
receptive to U.S. recognition and enforcement claims. As Professor
Brand describes:
The greatest disadvantage of the [Uniform Recognition Act] is that
uniformity is so elusive ....Even more troublesome is the damage to

uniformity engendered when states have modified the [Recognition
Act] in order either to make reciprocity a discretionary ground for
nonrecognition or to make all grounds for nonrecognition, including
reciprocity, mandatory."
While a majority of states have adopted the 1962 version of the
Recognition Act, not all have limited the defenses to recognition to those
laid out in that act. At least two states have enacted legislation requiring
reciprocity as a mandatory condition to the recognition of a foreign
judgment: Georgia and Massachusetts." At least five others, Florida,
Idaho, North Carolina, Maine, and Texas, have codified lack of
reciprocity as a discretionary defense to recognition." Additionally, while
New York and California have not adopted a lack-of-reciprocity defense
in their versions of the Recognition Act, those states may choose to
enforce the Hilton reciprocity rule where the defendant is a U.S. citizen. 3
Nevertheless, the majority of states, regardless of whether they have
adopted the Recognition Act to any extent, appear to reject reciprocity. 4
2.

The Restatements

Likewise, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
("Restatement of Foreign Relations") and the Restatement (Second) of

48. Id. § 4(c)(I)-(8).
49. Saad Gul, Old Rules for a New World? The Constitutional Underpinnings of U.S. Foreign
Judgment Enforcement Doctrine, 5 APPALACHIAN J.L. 67, 89 (2oo6) (quoting Guinness PLC v. Ward,
955 F.2d 875, 884 (4th Cir. 1992)).
50. Brand, supra note 43, at 288.
51. See Richard H. M. Maloy & Desamparados M. Nisi, A Message to the Supreme Court: The
Next Time You Get a Chance, PleaseLook at Hilton v. Guyot, We Think It Needs Repairing, 5J. INr'L
LEGAL STUD. 1,37 (1999); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-138 (1993); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 235, § 23A
(LexisNexis 2007).
52. ROBERT

E. LuTz, A LAWYER'S
n.iI6 (2007).

HANDBOOK FOR ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED

STATES AND ABROAD 27

53. Id. at 27-28.
54. See PROPOSED ACT, supra note

2I,

§ 7 reporters' note 3.
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Conflict of Laws ("Restatement of Conflict of Laws") mirror states' laws
rejecting reciprocity as a precondition to recognition of a foreign-money
judgment. The Restatement of Foreign Relations states that, absent any
valid defenses in the Restatement of Foreign Relations, a "final
judgment of a court of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a
sum of money, establishing or confirming the status of a person, or
determining interests in property, is conclusive between the parties, and
is entitled to recognition in courts in the United States."55 Furthermore,
"[a] judgment otherwise entitled to recognition will not be denied
recognition or enforcement because courts in the rendering state might
not enforce a judgment of a court in the United States if the
circumstances were reversed." 6 The Restatement of Foreign Relations
rejects reciprocity as a condition or discretionary defense to recognition
and enforcement in accordance with the practices of most states, which
recognize and enforce foreign judgments based on international comity. 7
The scope of the Restatement of Foreign Relations is not confined to
money judgments, as is the Recognition Act.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, while primarily
addressing the recognition and enforcement of federal and sister state
judgments,60 states that an American court is permitted to recognize and
enforce a "valid" foreign judgment.6' It, too, acknowledges that the
majority of state courts and federal courts in diversity cases omit
reciprocity as an element to the recognition analysis. 6
While both the Restatement of Foreign Relations and the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws permit the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments falling within their scope, the requirements for and
defenses to recognition and enforcement provided under each
Restatement differ slightly. Under the Restatement of Foreign Relations,
a court is prohibited from recognizing a foreign judgment if: (i) the
foreign judicial system lacks impartial tribunals or procedures in
accordance with due process of law; or (2) personal jurisdiction was
absent under the foreign state's law as well as the Restatement of
Foreign Relations. 63 An American court has the discretion to refuse
recognizing a foreign judgment in six circumstances characterizing the
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 481(1) (1987).

56. Id. cmt. d (emphasis added).
57. See id. reporters' note I.
58. See id. reporters' note 2.
59. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws extends to money-judgments, orders, injunctions,
decrees, and judgments of probate courts, admiralty courts, and other special courts. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92 cmt. a (1971).
60. See id., introductory note.
61. Id. § 98.
62. See id. § 98 cmt. f.
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482(I)(a)-(b) (1987).
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judgment: (I) lack of subject matter jurisdiction;

(2) lack of timely notice;
(3)the judgment was obtained by fraud; (4)the judgment or underlying
cause of action is repugnant to public policy of the state where
recognition is sought or of the United States; (5)conflict with another
recognized judgment; or (6) conflict with an agreement by the parties to
litigate in a different forum.64
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws also covers these requirements
and defenses to recognition and enforcement, but in different forms. The
Restatement of Conflict of Laws mandates that the foreign judgment be
"valid" to be recognized, meaning the foreign court must have judicial
jurisdiction; provide a reasonable method of notice and opportunity to
be heard; be competent; and validly exercise power based on the foreign
nation's standards. 6' Additionally, the Restatement of Conflict of Laws
requires, as a condition to recognition, that Hilton's six requirements are
satisfied. These requirements include that a system of jurisprudence be
present that is "likely to secure an impartial administration of justice
between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and
there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, in the system
of
66
laws under which it is sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment."

Major discrepancies do not exist between both Restatements, but a
slight distinction does. Under the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law,
lack of timely notice and the presence of fraud are discretionary defenses
to recognition and enforcement. That is, they must be raised as defenses
by the judgment debtor and must be accepted by the presiding American
court as such. Under the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, however, an
American court must not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment when
either of these "defenses" exists, regardless of whether they are
presented as defenses by the judgment debtor. Regardless of these minor
discrepancies, both Restatements, as well as the Recognition Act, reflect
the law of most states on recognition and enforcement: that reciprocity is
not required.

II.

THE WORLD'S RESPONSE TO UNPREDICTABILITY: FOREIGN

APPROACHES TO THE RECOGNITION OF U.S. MONEY-JUDGMENTS

Although the majority of state and federal courts in the United
States have not adopted reciprocity as a precondition to recognition, nor
considered reciprocity a discretionary defense to recognition, the same
cannot be said about foreign nations in recognizing and enforcing U.S.
money-judgments. As of 2001, at least seven major U.S. trading

64. See id. § 482(2)(a)-(f).

65. See RESTATEMENT
66. Id. § 98 cmt. c.

(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF

LAWS § 92(a)-(d)

(1971.
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partners-Mexico, England, 67 Canada, China, Japan, Spain and
Germany-require reciprocity to some degree before they will recognize
and enforce a U.S. money-judgmenti t
In the common law countries of England and Canada, a U.S. moneyjudgment will only be recognized and enforced through expedited
processes if statutory reciprocal arrangements exist between the
respective nation and the United States. England has no such
arrangement with the United States, forcing U.S. litigants to seek
recognition and enforcement through England's common law as opposed
to England's Foreign Judgments Reciprocal Enforcement Act, which
provides for a registration process. 69 As Canada follows a federal system
like the United States, the law of recognition and enforcement is
reserved for its individual provinces. Absent a statutory reciprocal
arrangement between the appropriate province and the United States, a
U.S. litigant must rely on a common law cause of action.'v No such
arrangement currently exists. To complicate the process further, the
statutory reciprocal arrangements that do exist are only with a limited
number of states bordering Canada."
Civil law countries follow different approaches. In Spain, reciprocity
is required where a convention or treaty does not exist between Spain
and the state in which the money-judgment originated.72 Accordingly,
U.S. money-judgments are subject to a reciprocity requirement in
Spain.73 Similarly, Germany will not recognize a U.S. money-judgment if
67. As referenced in this Article, "England" refers to one country within Great Britain, not the
whole island of Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales) or the United Kingdom (Great Britain
and the Northeast part of Ireland).
68. See COMM. ON FOREIGN AND COMP. LAW, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., SURVEY ON
FOREIGN RECOGNITION

OF U.S. MONEY JUDGMENTS

18-20 (2OO1)

[hereinafter SURVEY ON FOREIGN

RECOGNITION]; Brandon B. Danford, The Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United
States and Europe: How Can We Achieve a Comprehensive Treaty?, 23 REV. LITIG. 381, 400 (2004)
(discussing the recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments in Germany).
69. See Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (c.13), available at
http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/ (in the title field enter "foreign judgments"; then select "go"; select the
"Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933" hyperlink).
70. See I ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS, at Can-Io (Lawrence W. Newman ed., 2006)
("Legislation which provides for enforcement of foreign judgments upon registration has been enacted
in all of the provinces and territories except Quebec ....They provide a procedure whereby a foreign
judgment from a 'reciprocating jurisdiction' may be registered and, once registered, enforced as
though it were a judgment rendered by the courts in that province."). The United States is not
mentioned as a reciprocating jurisdiction for purposes of Canadian registration. Id.
71. See SURVEY ON FOREIGN RECOGNITION, supra note 68, at I8-i9.
72. See id. at 19.
73. See id. at 19-2o; see also 3 ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS, supra note 70, at SPA-I7 to 19. Under the Spanish reciprocity regime, recognition alone may not satisfy the reciprocity
requirement. Specifically, a Spanish court "may require [a U.S. money judgment] to comply with the
prerequisites which a similar Spanish judgment would have to meet in order to be enforced in the
country of origin." Id. at SPA-I5. For example, if U.S. courts are willing to recognize certain Spanish
judgments but still review the merits of a case, a Spanish court will treat a U.S. money-judgment
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the United States will not enforce a similar German judgment.74 Under
Japanese law, reciprocity too is a prerequisite to recognition.75 China and
Mexico, on the other hand, appear more flexible, treating reciprocity as a
factor to be considered at the discretion of the court. 6
A.

IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES:
THE BRUSSELS/LUGANO RECOGNITION SYSTEM

As many of the Unites States' primary trading partners consider
reciprocity to some degree in deciding whether to recognize and enforce
a U.S. money-judgment, some scholars have argued that the United
States' generosity in recognizing and enforcing foreign money-judgments
has backfired. The reciprocity provisions imposed by foreign nations are,
to a large extent, the consequence of the United States' failure to enter
bilateral or multilateral treaties with those nations. Scholars have argued
that, in light of the treaties that do exist between foreign nations and the
lack of treaties between those nations and the United States, U.S.
money-judgments have received less favorable treatment in foreign
nations.77 The Brussels Convention (the "Convention") illustrates this
argument.
The Convention was signed by the original member states of the

European Community ("E.C."): Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, in 1968.78 The Convention requires
that one contracting state recognize the judgment rendered by another
contracting state, so long as that judgment is civil or commercial in
nature.79 The Convention includes five defenses to the recognition of a
similarly, reviewing the merits of the judgment before deciding whether to recognize it. See SURVEY ON
FOREIGN RECOGNITION, supra note 68, at 19-20.
74. See I ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS, supra note 70, at FRG-21 to -22. Reciprocity is one
of five exceptions that will preclude a German court from recognizing a foreign judgment (mandatory
grounds for non-recognition). Id. The other four exceptions are: (I) the foreign court lacks "minimal
jurisdiction qualifications" defined by German law; (2) notice to the defendant was improper; (3) the
foreign judgment conflicts with proceeding commenced earlier, foreign or German; and (4)
enforcement would interfere with "basic German legal principles." Id.
75. See SURVEY ON FOREIGN RECOGNITION, supra note 68, at i9; see also 2 ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY
JUDGMENTS, supra note 70, at JAP-21 to -22.
76. See SURVEY ON FOREIGN RECOGNITION, supra note 68, at i8-19; see also I ENFORCEMENT OF
MONEY JUDGMENTS, supra note 7o, at CHI-HK-2 5 to -26 ("The Chief Executive in Council also has the
power to revoke any order extending the FJREO [Foreign Judgments Reciprocal Enforcement
Ordinance] to a particular country, and may specifically do so on the grounds of lack of reciprocity.").
77. See Kevin M. Clermont, A Global Law of Jurisdictionand Judgments: Views from the United
States and Japan, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 13-14 (2004) ("Americans are being whipsawed by the
European approach. Not only are they still subject (in theory) to the far-reaching jurisdiction of
European courts and the wide recognition and enforceability of the resulting European judgments, but
also U.S. judgments tend (in practice) to receive short shrift in European courts.").
78. See Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Preamble, Sept. 27, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969) [hereinafter Convention]; see also Danford,
supra note 68, at 390.
79. See Convention,supra note 78, at arts. 21, 26. Additionally, the Convention does not apply to:
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contracting party's judgment. A judgment will not be recognized:
i. if such recognition is contrary to public policy in the State in which
recognition is sought;
2. where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not
duly served with the document which instituted the proceedings or
with an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to
arrange for his defense;
3. if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute
between the same parties in the State in which recognition is sought;
4. if the court of the State of origin, in order to arrive at its judgment,
has decided a preliminary question concerning the status or legal
capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a
matrimonial relationship, wills or succession in a way that conflicts
with a rule of the private international law of the State in which the
recognition is sought, unless the same result would have been reached
by the application of the rules of private international law of that State;

5. if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in a
non-contracting State involving the same cause of action and between
the same parties, provided that this latter judgment fulfils the
conditions necessary for its recognition in the state addressed.8'
The Convention does not provide for a reciprocity defense.8 '
Similarly, the Lugano Convention, signed in 1988 by six original
member states of the European Free Trade Association, Norway,
Sweden, Finland, Austria, Iceland, and Switzerland," was designed to
"exten[d] the principles of [the Brussels] Convention to the States [which
are] parties to this instrument [to] strengthen legal and economic
cooperation in Europe.... "83
Arguably, both the Brussels and Lugano Conventions discriminate
against the United States in various ways. For example, the Brussels
Convention prohibits "exorbitant

. .

. jurisdiction" as the only source of

jurisdiction for a cause of action against the domiciliary of one
contracting state brought in the court of another contracting state.84
Exorbitant jurisdiction has been defined as "jurisdiction validly exercised
i. the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a
matrimonial relationship, wills and succession; 2. bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the
winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements,
compositions, and analogous proceedings; 3. social security; and 4. arbitration.
Id. at art. i.
80. Id. at art. 27.
81. See id.
82. See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. i6, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 620 (8989) [hereinafter Lugano Convention]; see also Annex to the
Agreement Amending the Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association:
Consolidated Version of the Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association 3 (2000.
83. Lugano Convention, supra note 82, at Preamble.
84. Danford, supra note 68, at 398.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vo1. 59:943

under the jurisdictional rules of a state that nevertheless appears
unreasonable to non-nationals because of the grounds used to justify
jurisdiction."8 Since the United States is not a party to the Brussels
Convention, a judgment rendered against a U.S. litigant based solely on
exorbitant jurisdiction would not be prohibited from enforceability in all
signatory
states to the Brussels Convention because of its jurisdictional
S86
basis. However, if this same judgment were rendered against a
domiciliary of a signatory state to the Brussels Convention, it would
automatically be rejected by the non-forum signatory states.
B.

THE OBSTACLES TO RECOGNITION OF U.S. JUDGMENTS ABROAD

Although the United States may not receive the same preferable
treatment afforded to contracting parties of the Brussels or Lugano
Conventions, or other treaties for that matter, the primary reason why
U.S. money-judgments are not recognized abroad as often as foreign
money-judgments are recognized in the United States in the absence of
treaties is unclear. Although empirical data is unavailable to demonstrate
how often U.S. judgments are refused recognition and enforcement in
foreign nations, scholars have noted that "some countries are particularly
hostile to recognition or enforcement of U.S. judgments., 8' Foreign
nations may invoke a number of defenses to recognition, such as lack of
personal jurisdiction, inadequate notice, and conflicts with prior final
judgmentsim Two additional potential obstacles, to be addressed here,
are: (i) the lack of reciprocity by the U.S. state in which the judgment
was rendered or the state whose law governed the claim heard by a U.S.
federal court with diversity jurisdiction; or (2) that the U.S. judgment is
in violation of the foreign jurisdiction's public policy.
i. Lack of Reciprocity
The task of sorting through the United States' current system for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign money-judgments is daunting to
any foreign litigant. In theory, the United States' fifty states may have
various approaches to recognition and enforcement. Unfortunately, this
theoretical framework is not far from the truth.
For example, suppose a Spanish manufacturer ("S") entered into a
contract with a Texas corporation ("T") for the sale of boots. A fallout
85. Kathryn A. Russell, Note, Exorbitant Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: The
Brussels System as Impetus for United States Action, 19 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMP. 57, 59 (I993)
(citing H. Nadelmann, JurisdictionallyImproper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The
Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (1967)).
86. See Danford, supra note 68, at398-99.
87. Linda Silberman, On the Occasion of His Retirement: A Tribute to ProfessorHarold G. Maier:
TransnationalLitigation:Is There a "Field"?A Tribute to Hal Maier, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1427,
1435 (2oo6)

(citing RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT

OF JUDGMENTS

OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE

BRUSSELS AND LUGANO CONVENMONS (Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner eds., 2000)).
88. See generally SURVEY ON FOREIGN RECOGNITION, supra note 68.
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ensued and T brought suit against S in Texas state court for breach of
contract. Upon receiving a favorable judgment, T sought to enforce the
judgment against S's assets in Spain. Since Spain requires reciprocity as a
precondition to the recognition of U.S. money-judgments, its court would
have to determine whether Texas state courts would enforce a Spanish
money-judgment in similar circumstances. However, since Texas treats
reciprocity as a discretionary defense to recognition and enforcement of
foreign money-judgments, whether Texas would recognize and enforce a
Spanish judgment would depend upon two factors: whether the judgment
debtor would raise the reciprocity defense in the first place and if so,
whether a Texas court would refuse to recognize the judgment based on
this defense. Consequently, Spanish courts, not knowing whether its
judgments would be recognized and enforced in Texas, would be unable
to determine whether its own reciprocity requirement were satisfied such
that T could recover its favorable judgment against S' assets in Spain.
Professor Brand details the inherent problems a foreign court must
tackle in determining whether to recognize and enforce U.S. moneyjudgments. If the judgment is rendered by a U.S. federal district court
sitting in diversity, the foreign court "is forced to try to understand the
United States federal system and the manner in which Erie requires a
federal court in the United States to look to state law."8 Additionally,
the foreign court must decipher the appropriate state law from state
statutes, state case law, or in the absence of either, federal case law or
inferences from sister states' laws. 9 The burden placed upon nations to
discern the laws of other nations is not a new allocation of responsibility.
However, the problem confronted by foreign nations deciphering the
recognition and enforcement laws of the United States is that, in regards
to those states that permit reciprocity as a discretionary defense, the law
itself does not provide certainty to foreign nations. They are still unclear
as to whether those states will recognize and enforce foreign judgments.
2.
Violation of PublicPolicy
U.S. judgments awarding punitive damages or multiple damagesdamages doubling or even tripling the actual compensatory damages
incurred-have been rejected by a number of foreign jurisdictions as
well.9' In general, common law countries refuse to reward a party beyond
actual damages suffered by enforcing contractual "penalty clauses" and
civil law countries follow a "public policy rationale . . . to favor
compensation over deterrence in civil matters."92 Similarly, then, these

89. Brand, supra note 43, at 282.
o
9 . See id.
91. See SURVEY ON FOREIGN RECOGNMON, supra note 68, at 9-O; Stevens, supra note 27, at 128
(citing EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1202 (3d ed. 2000)).
92. SURVEY ON FOREIGN RECOGNMON, supra note 68, at to.
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countries generally reject damages exceeding that required to remedy
actual harm incurred by a party, whether by a limited amount (double or
treble damages) or by an extreme amount (punitive damages).
III.

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S RESPONSE TO UNPREDICTABILITY:

THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS PROJECT

Regardless of the precise reasons why U.S. judgments may not be
recognized as frequently as foreign judgments are recognized in the
United States, scholars have agreed that U.S. law must be re-evaluated
and revised to protect U.S. litigants seeking to enforce favorable
judgments in foreign nations. Consequently, beginning in 1998, the ALl
began work on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Project (previously titled the International Jurisdiction and Judgments
Project),93 which entailed drafting a Proposed Foreign Judgments
Recognition Act.' Concurrently, over forty countries were negotiating a
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Foreign Judgments
(the "Jurisdiction Convention").9 Accordingly, the ALI worked on two
draft statutes, one implementing the Jurisdiction Convention in the
United States (Plan A) and one as a draft federal statute for the U.S.
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (Plan B). 6
The most significant progress was made on the Plan B draft statute,
not the Plan A implementing legislation. In 2006, the ALI released a
final proposed statute ("the Proposed Act").97 As such, this discussion
will focus on the Proposed Act's potential as a source of U.S. law on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The Proposed Act
constitutes a major departure from American jurisprudence on
recognition and enforcement for the past century. Its most controversial
provision, and the focus of my analysis, is its inclusion of a reciprocity
defense.
In attempting to protect U.S. litigants from the less-than-favorable
treatment currently provided to U.S. money-judgments in foreign
nations, the ALI devoted section 7 of the Proposed Act to establishing a
reciprocity scheme for the recognition of foreign judgments. Specifically,
section 7(a) of the Proposed Act demands that foreign judgments not be
enforced if "the court finds that comparable judgments of courts in the
United States would not be recognized or enforced in the courts of the

93. See Memorandum from Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Professor Linda Silberman to the
ALl Council for the Project on Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention (Nov. 30, 1998), available at
http://www.ali.org/ali/i999_Loweni .htm.
94. See Stevens, supra note 27, at 130 (citing REPORTER'S SUMMARY TO MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, at xi (2000)).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See generally PROPOSED ACT, supra note 21.
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state of origin." The ALI Reporters' Notes carefully distinguish
between the discretion currently allotted to courts under state law to
determine whether lack of reciprocity should constitute a defense to
recognition and enforcement and the lack of such discretion afforded to
them under the Proposed Act:
[M]ost of the states that have included a provision on reciprocity in
their version of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act have authorized, but not required, their courts to deny recognition
or enforcement on the ground of lack of reciprocity, thus leaving the
decision to the discretion of the trial court. This Act,
designed
to
achieve uniformity throughout the United States, rejects discretion in
this context. While the role of the judge is important in making the
determinations called for by subsections (b), (c), and (d), if these
determinations result in a finding of lack of reciprocity, subsection (a)
provides that a foreign judgment shall not be enforced.'
Under section 7(b), the judgment debtor carries the burden to raise
the reciprocity defense. Subsequently, the judgment debtor must prove
"that there is substantial doubt that the courts of the state of origin
would grant recognition or enforcement to comparable judgments of
courts in the United States. ' ' °" If the judge determines that the judgment
debtor has made a sufficient showing of lack of reciprocity, he or she
must refuse to recognize the foreign judgment, a departure from some
states' current practice.'"' On the other hand, reciprocity is conclusively
established, without any judicial determination, if the Secretary of State
has negotiated a bilateral agreement on reciprocal practices with the
foreign country in question. Section 7(e) permits the Secretary of State to
enter such agreements.' Even if a bilateral agreement does not exist, the
foreign nation will not be automatically deemed to have failed the
reciprocity test.0 3
Many scholars agree that uniformity in the U.S. recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments is long overdue and that the ALI's
Proposed Act could be the catalyst for such reform. The heated debate,
however, is about whether a reciprocity requirement ought to be
included in the Proposed Act. This section will first critique the
effectiveness of the ALI's Proposed Act, taking into account the ALI's
goal to induce foreign nations to recognize and enforce U.S. judgments.
Some arguments made in support of and against a reciprocity defense are
briefly addressed here. Second, this section will include a suggestion as to
what extent, if any, a reciprocity requirement might be properly included
98.
99.
too.
ioi.
102.

Id. § 7(a).
Id. § 7 reporters' note 4.
Id. § 7(b).
See id. § 7(a).
See id. § 7(e).

103. See id.
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in the Proposed Act.
A.

REACHING Too FAR: THE BREADTH OF THE PROPOSED ACT'S
RECIPROCITY REQUIREMENT

The Proposed Act is a drastic 18o-degree turn from current
American jurisprudence on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments not only because it includes a reciprocity defense to
recognition, but also because this defense is extended to moneyjudgments and non money-judgments alike. While judgments
traditionally within the scope of public law, e.g., judgments for taxes,
fines, and penalties, need not be recognized and enforced under the
Proposed Act, they may be recognized and enforced so long as the
Proposed Act's requirements are satisfied. 4 Judgments related to family
matters (judgments for divorce, support, maintenance, and custody, for
example), bankruptcy, liquidation, arbitration agreements, and
arbitration awards are completely excluded from the Proposed Act's
reach, ' 5 such that their recognition and enforcement would continue to
be governed by state law. Aside from these distinct spheres, however, a
U.S. court would be free to, and in fact required to, refuse to recognize
and enforce a foreign judgment, be it for damages, an injunction, or
declaration, absent reciprocal recognition and enforcement by the
foreign nation if the reciprocity defense were raised.
The reach of the Proposed Act's reciprocity provision appears to
extend even to those judgments redressing individual rights that the
United States seeks to protect. The Proposed Act's effect on human
rights claims illustrates the Proposed Act's extreme scope. Presumably,
foreign nations whose courts enter injunctions prohibiting human rights
abuses, or whose courts additionally reward monetary damages to
torture victims, would likely recognize and enforce a "comparable" U.S.
judgment such that the reciprocity provision of the Proposed Act would
have no impact.
However, imagine the following situation: Foreign court X awarded
damages to individual A for a private corporation's human rights
violations. In a separate case brought by individual B, foreign court X
refused to recognize and enforce a U.S. judgment brought under the
Alien Torts Claims Act ("ATCA")" 6 and its counterpart, the Torture
Victim Protection Act of i991 ("TVPA")"'° , which allow non-U.S.
citizens to recover damages in U.S. federal courts for human rights
abuses, because personal jurisdiction over the defendant in this case was

104.
105.
io6.
IO7.

See id. § 2(b)(i).
See id. § I(A)(i)-(iii).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (20o0).

Id.
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based on "tag" service of process."° This basis of jurisdiction, where a
defendant is provided notice when temporarily passing through a U.S.
jurisdiction, is not permitted by many foreign nations, including some
European states.'" The Proposed Act's reciprocity provision suggests
that if the nation in which foreign court X sits has not entered into a
reciprocal agreement with the United States, a U.S. federal or state court
would not be permitted to recognize and enforce the damages awarded
by foreign court X if the judgment debtor-who committed the human
rights violations-raised the reciprocity defense and the U.S. judgment
was deemed "comparable" to that of foreign court X. While the award
would remain enforceable in the foreign country, individual A would not
be remedied by the foreign judgment if the judgment debtor relocated its
assets to the United States. Instead, he or she would have to bring a
separate lawsuit in the United States simply because foreign court X
refused to recognize a "comparable," but completely distinct, judgment
involving individual B. Here, the U.S. court's refusal would appear to be
more than an inducement for foreign nations to recognize and enforce
U.S. ATCA and TVPA judgments. The court's actions would appear to
be repugnant to the United States' own values. While this inconsistent
result might persuade the foreign nation to enter into a reciprocity
agreement with the United States, this retrospective remedy would do
nothing to alleviate the damages incurred by this victim.
In essence, while a court in the United States might refuse to
recognize and enforce a foreign judgment on the grounds of public
policy, such as foreign libel judgments which conflict with values
preserved by the First Amendment,"0 a reciprocity requirement might
preclude a court in the United States the authority to recognize and
enforce a foreign judgment where denying recognition and enforcement
would, in fact, violate U.S. notions of fairness and justice.
B.

No

UNIFORMITY BETWEEN SECTIONS

7(a)

AND

7(e)

OF THE PROPOSED

ACT

In its original draft of the Proposed Act, the ALI contemplated

io8. "Tag" service of process was first addressed in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 627
(i99o), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process was satisfied because service of process
to the defendant was provided when the defendant was in the relevant forum.
to9. See Edward A. Amley, Jr., Sue and Be Recognized: Collecting §1350 Judgments Abroad, 1O7
YALE L.J. 2177, 2183-84 (1998).
iio. See Christine Duh, Cyberlaw: Internet Jurisdiction:International: Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 359, 368 (2002) (discussing the state and federal courts' refusal to enforce foreign
judgments "which offend free speech values protected by the First Amendment"); see also Eric P.
Enson, A Roadblock on the Detour Around the FirstAmendment: Is the Enforcement of English Libel
Judgments in the United States Unconstitutional?, 21 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 159, s66 (1999)
(discussing the conflict between English common law and the United States Constitution in regards to
freedom of speech).
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three variations of a reciprocity requirement. The first version reflected
current American jurisprudence, that reciprocity not be required for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.'" The second version
permitted the judgment debtor to raise a reciprocity defense, and in so
doing, demonstrate by "clear and convincing evidence" the absence of
reciprocity." 2 Scholars have termed this a "case-by-case approach" to the
issue of recognition and enforcement. The third version, in stark contrast
to the second, created a bright-line rule whereby the Secretary of State
would pronounce which foreign nations fulfilled the reciprocity
requirement. All judgments rendered in a nation within this category
would then be recognized and enforced, only subject to limited defenses.
This procedure is termed an "all-or-nothing" approach." 3
The final version of the Proposed Act, though, incorporates both the
case-by-case and modified all-or-nothing approaches. Far removed from
the ALI's goal of establishing uniformity in a disjunctive area of
American jurisprudence, section 7 of the Proposed Act will leave foreign
nations in the same state of confusion from which they currently suffer in
determining whether their judgments will be recognized and enforced in
the United States. First, section 7(a) alone fails to provide the
predictability necessary to encourage foreign nations to recognize and
enforce U.S. judgments, the ALI's purpose in including a reciprocity
defense to the Proposed Act. Specifically, sections 7(a)-(b) allow a
judgment debtor to raise the reciprocity defense and then place the
burden upon him to prove that reciprocity does not exist for a
comparable U.S. judgment."4 Under this scheme, a foreign nation would
be unclear as to whether the Proposed Act's reciprocity requirement
would preclude the U.S. court from recognizing its judgment because it
would not be able to predict whether the judgment debtor would raise
the reciprocity defense in the first place.
Even where section 7(a) is considered concurrently with section
7(e), which gives the Secretary of State the power to enter reciprocal
arrangements with foreign nations, section 7(a) might induce instability
in U.S. recognition and enforcement law. Establishing reciprocal
arrangements with foreign nations is no easy task, as evidenced by the
United States' previous attempts with England. Section 7(a), then, would
more likely be invoked in many, rather than few, cases if foreign nations
were given a choice between the two.
Moreover, uncertainty remains whether, if the defense is raised, the

I II. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL
(Council Draft No. I, NOV. 20, 2001).
I12. Id.
113. Stevens, supra note 27, at 131.
114. See PROPOSED AcT, supra note 21, § 7(a)-(b).
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judgment debtor will satisfactorily prove that reciprocity does not, in
fact, exist. Section 7(b) permits the judgment debtor to rely upon expert
testimony or judicial notice "if the law of the state of origin or decisions
of its courts are clear" to satisfy his or her burden of proof."5 However,
section 7(c) indicates that the final determination of whether the
reciprocity condition is met may be predicated upon the court's
evaluation of whether the foreign nation's courts deny enforcement to:
(I) judgments against its own nationals in favor of nationals of another
state; (2) judgments originating in U.S. federal or state courts; (3)
compensatory damages awarded in actions for personal injury or death;
(4) judgments for statutory claims; and (5)U.S. federal or state court
judgments of a type similar to the foreign judgment at issue. The court
may also consider whether the foreign nation recognizes other nations'
judgments. " '
The Proposed Act does not indicate what specific circumstances
would trigger necessary judicial review of these factors if reciprocity were
raised as a defense. Nor does it indicate which of the six factors must be
considered. In fact, the list, while "illustrative" of the existence of
reciprocity, is "not exhaustive, and no one factor is conclusive."'" 7 The
court is simply directed to inquire, "as appropriate," whether the foreign
nations would deny enforcement in the listed circumstances."' The
Proposed Act's plain language places broad discretion in the hands of the
U.S. judge. She not only determines how much weight to place upon the
evidence presented by the judgment debtor as to the existence of
reciprocity, but she also decides whether to consider any one of the
factors identified in section 7(c) and to what extent, if any, they weigh
towards a finding of reciprocity. Sections 7(a), 7(b) and 7(c) create more
confusion than clarity for foreign courts. As a result, a U.S. court's
decision whether to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment may or
may not be based on unpredictable factors: a judgment debtor's decision
whether to raise a reciprocity defense, his ability to prove lack of
reciprocity, a U.S. court's decision whether to consider the factors in

115. Id. § 7(b). A previous version of the Proposed Act had provided for two possible burdens of
proof, specifically stating that "[o]nce the defense of lack of reciprocity is raised, [the judgment
creditor or other person seeking to rely on the foreign judgment shall have the burden to show that the
courts of the state of origin would grant recognition and enforcement to comparable judgments of
courts in the United States.] [the party resisting recognition or enforcement shall have the burden to
show that there is substantial doubt that the courts of the state of origin would grant recognition or
enforcement to comparable judgments of courts in the United States.]" AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT § 7(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2, Apr. 13, 2004). In
the final version of the Proposed Act, the ALI adopted the latter approach, imposing the burden to
prove the lack of reciprocity upon the judgment debtor. PROPOSED ACT, supra note 21, § 7(b).
I16. See id. § 7(c)(i)-(v).
II7.Id. § 7 cmt. f.
sI8. Id. § 7(c).
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section 7(c) and, if so, which factors to consider, and to what extent such
factors do or do not lead to a finding of reciprocity.
Additionally, while precedent might eventually be used as a test to
determine whether reciprocity exists, its scope might be limited. For
example, in evaluating whether a foreign nation would recognize and
enforce a "comparable" U.S. judgment, a judge might define
"comparable judgment" more narrowly than defined in prior cases such
that those prior cases might not constitute binding precedent. Assume
the California Supreme Court determined in a breach of contract case
between a U.S. plaintiff and foreign defendant that the foreign nation in
which the defendant resides recognizes and enforces "comparable" U.S.
money-judgments, defining "comparable judgments" as those breach of
contract judgments based on contract law principles upon which U.S.
courts rely. However, a California trial court, presented with a breach of
contract case in which a foreign government has breached its loan
agreement with a U.S. bank might treat this case as one of first
impression, finding that precedent for breach of contract cases between
private parties is not binding upon breach of contract cases between
foreign governments and private parties. Given the discretion judges
have under section 7(c) to consider multiple factors in determining
whether reciprocity exists, and the limited value precedent may have if
judges interpret "comparable judgments" differently, section 7(c) does
not alleviate, but rather adds to, the confusion posed by the Proposed
Act.
In contrast, section 7(e) concentrates discretion in the hands of the
Secretary of State, permitting her to enter into reciprocal agreements for
particular types of judgments with foreign nations. Unlike the authority
provided under section 7(c), a U.S. judge has no discretion under section
7(e) whether to consider an existing reciprocal agreement as just one
factor indicating that reciprocity does exist. Rather, a reciprocal
agreement is conclusive evidence that reciprocity exists regarding
judgments covered by the agreement." 9 The agreements "need not be
formal treaties, but could be Memoranda of Understanding, exchanges
of Diplomatic Notes, or similar bilateral declarations. . ...
On its face, section 7(e) appears to establish the predictability that
foreign nations seek from the United States regarding recognition and
enforcement jurisprudence. A foreign nation is guaranteed that if it
enters into a bilateral reciprocal arrangement with the United States,
judgments covered by the agreement will be recognized so long as none
of the traditional defenses to recognition are raised. In fact, such a rule
might actually encourage foreign nations to enter into these reciprocal
i19. See id. § 7 (e).
120. Id. § 7 cmt. c.
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agreements with the United States, a key reason the ALI chose to
incorporate this alternate form of reciprocity into the Proposed Act."'
However, section 7(e) does not stop there. Instead, it provides that:
The fact that no such agreement between the state of origin and the
United States is in effect, or that the agreement is not applicable with
respect to the judgment for which recognition or enforcement is
sought, does not of itself establish that the state fails to meet the
reciprocity requirement of this section.'22
The rigid, bright-line rule first established by section 7(e) is thus
diluted by that section's subsequent language. Reading section 7(e) in
conjunction with section 7(b), it appears that section 7(b) creates a
presumption that reciprocity exists, which must be rebutted by a
judgment debtor resisting recognition or enforcement. A judgment
creditor could always rely upon section 7 (b) as a blockade to a judgment
debtor's attempt to preclude recognition and enforcement. Section 7(e),
then, merely acts as a safe harbor for a judgment creditor. As a result,
the message conveyed by section 7(e) is muddled. Foreign nations are
told that if they want to guarantee that the Proposed Act's reciprocity
defense does not hinder the recognition and enforcement of their
judgments in the United States, they ought to enter bilateral reciprocal
agreements with the United States. However, they are also told the
reciprocity defense will be ineffective, even if they do not have reciprocal
agreements with the United States, if the judgment debtor is unable to
show "substantial doubt" that reciprocity exists.
Some proponents of a reciprocity defense may support the ALI's
attempt to provide a flexible process for establishing reciprocity-a caseby-case or a reciprocal agreement analysis.'23 In fact, in supporting the
inclusion of a reciprocity defense in the Proposed Act, one commentator
suggested that the ALI's failure to impose a bright-line standard in
determining whether reciprocity exists indicates the ease with which the
reciprocity requirement may be met.'24 Likewise, game theorists have
commended the Proposed Act's "flexible solution" of "combin[ing] the
flexibility of the case-by-case approach from Version A with a softer
121. See id. § 7 cmt. b ("Subsection (e) is designed to provide the incentive to foreign states of
avoiding lengthy and possibly expensive proceedings to secure recognition and enforcement of
judgments rendered in their courts.").
122. Id. § 7(e).
123. See Franklin 0. Ballard, Note, TurnaboutIs FairPlay: Why a Reciprocity Requirement Should
Be Included in the America Law Institute's Proposed Federal Statute, 28 Hous. J. Ir'L L. 199, 234
(2oo6) ("The United States is clearly at a fundamental bargaining disadvantage. The addition of the
reciprocity requirement will help level the playing field and allow the Department of State to better
[T]he United States has an inherent right to protect
represent U.S. interests in future negotiations ....
its interests ....
").
124. See id. at 227 (explaining how, under section 7(c) of the Proposed Act, if a foreign state
recognizes third states' judgments absent a treaty, such conduct might be sufficient proof of reciprocity
by foreign nations for purposes of the Proposed Act's reciprocity provision).
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version of the leveraging power from the all-or-nothing procedure of
Version B."'' . 5 However, if the Proposed Act is to have any weight in
inducing foreign nations to enter into reciprocal agreements with the
United States, section 7(e) must be read with the assumption that a
foreign nation would find the likelihood that the judgment debtor would
successfully disprove reciprocity more burdensome than entering a
bilateral reciprocal agreement with the United States. In other words,
section 7(e) might only induce a foreign nation to enter into a reciprocal
agreement if the foreign nation were more willing to recognize and
enforce U.S. judgments than to incur the risk that the United States
would not recognize and enforce its own judgments. The assumption that
a foreign nation would make such a sacrifice seems far-reaching,
particularly where section 7 establishes a presumption of reciprocity
which the judgment debtor has the burden to rebut. As mentioned
earlier, precedent might act as limited leverage given the discretion U.S.
judges would receive under the Proposed Act to define the scope of
"comparable judgments" and apply factors they deem relevant in
determining whether reciprocity exists.
Scholars have agreed that, regardless if the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States should be
predicated on a reciprocity requirement, the time has arrived to present a
unified approach upon which foreign nations may rely in predicting
whether their judgments would be recognized and enforced in the United
States. The ALI incorporated a reciprocity defense that might be
considered a "compromise" of sorts, perhaps to alleviate the heavy
criticism it faced for including the defense in the first place.26 While a
commendable approach, its effect might be disappointing because, faced
with a choice between a U.S. court refusing to recognize and enforce one
of its judgments versus the burden to recognize and enforce all U.S.
judgments covered by an agreement, a foreign nation might well choose
the former, particularly since a judgment debtor might not raise the
reciprocity defense. A foreign nation might choose the latter if the
Proposed Act was complimented with political pressure from the United
States, perhaps in the form of business transaction restraints. However,
alone, the Proposed Act does not appear to have the persuasive power it
was designed to exert.

125. Stevens, supra note 27, at 155.
126. See PROPOSED Act, supra note 21, § 7 cmts. b, g. Compare id. § 7 cmt. g (describing how the
burden of proof, under section 7(b), on the party resisting recognition or enforcement is intended to
"minimize the obstacles to rapid and efficient enforcement of foreign judgments, and on the other
hand to provide genuine incentives to states to assure reciprocal treatment to judgments rendered in
the United States"), with id. § 7 cmt. b (noting that section 7(e), the reciprocal arrangement provision,
was "designed to provide the incentive to foreign states of avoiding lengthy and possibly expensive
proceedings to secure recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in their courts").
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FINDING A DIFFERENT COMPROMISE: THE EXTENT TO WHICH

RECIPROCITY SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE PROPOSED ACT

The Proposed Act's reciprocity provision was not designed to
impose additional burdens to secure the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, "but rather [was designed] to create an incentive to
foreign countries to commit to recognition and enforcement of
judgments rendered in the United States."'27 This goal will likely not be
achieved by the Proposed Act in its current form because section 7
essentially creates a presumption that reciprocity exists, while placing a
high burden to rebut this presumption on the party resisting recognition
or enforcement. A foreign nation might have greater incentive to await
the results of the judgment debtor's efforts, rather then enter into a
reciprocal arrangement with the United States. To create an incentive for
foreign countries to recognize and enforce U.S. judgments, section 7 of
the Proposed Act must be revised. Two possible routes are detailed
below.
A.

BRIGHT-LINE RULE

It is difficult to imagine that a foreign nation would be induced to
enter into a reciprocal agreement with the United States if such an
agreement were not a mandatory requirement for the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment in the United States. If section 7(e) is
to successfully persuade foreign nations to enter into these agreements, it
must demand that such agreements exist before foreign judgments will
be recognized and enforced. Just as courts refuse to recognize and
enforce foreign public law where legislation or treaties do not exist,
perhaps they should also refuse to do so for private international law.
Although he does not endorse a reciprocity defense regarding private
parties' claims, Professor William Dodge describes the similarity
between private international law and public law which might justify such
a response:
The basic point is that the enforcement of judgments is necessary to
make a legal system effective ....Just as the enforcement of foreign

judgments is necessary to make the legal rules that facilitate trade
(primarily the rules of contract law) optimally effective, so too the
enforcement of foreign judgments is necessary to make the rules that
regulate trade to prevent harm (like antitrust and securities law)
optimally effective. If judges should nonetheless refuse to enforce
foreign penal, tax, and regulatory law in order to facilitate cooperation
by the political branches
8 of government, perhaps they should do the
same with private law.2
Nevertheless, in objecting to a reciprocity defense to private law claims,

Id. § 7 cmt. b.
128. William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 16l, 229
127.

(2002).
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he argues that reciprocity should too be disregarded in foreign public law
claims where the plaintiff is a private party.'29
The burden currently imposed on the judgment debtor to prove lack
of reciprocity does not create an incentive for foreign nations to enter
reciprocal agreements. Neither would the alternative burden of proofproffered in a previous draft of the Proposed Act but later rejectedoutweigh the burden imposed on foreign nations by a reciprocal
agreement. This alternative approach would place the burden of proof
on the judgment creditor to prove that reciprocity exists. In this case, a
foreign nation might have to weigh its options more carefully in deciding
whether to enter a reciprocal agreement with the United States or to
subject judgment creditors, who presumably are its own citizens in most
cases, to the burden of proving that reciprocity exists. Albeit a more
difficult decision, it still seems unlikely that the foreign nation would be
willing to recognize all U.S. judgments falling within a specific category, a
possibility in the face of a reciprocal agreement, simply so that the
United States would recognize one of its own comparable judgments.
B.

COERCION THROUGH EXAMPLE: REJECTING A RECIPROCITY DEFENSE

The primary criticism against a bright-line reciprocity rule, or, for
that matter, against any version of reciprocity, is rooted in the principle
of fairness. 3 ' Professor Patrick Borchers, an ALI member, noted at the
Annual Meeting in May 2000 the unfairness in forcing parties to relitigate a matter that a U.S. court has determined "has been fairly tried in
a foreign forum just in an effort to implement policies entirely external to
those litigants."''3 ' Private litigants' rights declared and remedied in a
judicial proceeding should not be treated as collateral in the United
States' negotiations with foreign countries to reach accord on the issue of
recognition. Moreover, some critics have argued that "[w]hile it is clearly
unfair to punish citizens of a foreign country for the policies of their
government, retaliation against non-citizens of that foreign jurisdiction,
including U.S. citizens, is even more misguided."'32 As the ALI's
reciprocity provision is not limited to foreign judgments favoring foreign
creditors, a U.S. creditor's ability to recover under a favorable foreign
judgment may be subject to just as much risk under the Proposed Act.'33
While a bright-line reciprocity rule may be exactly what the United
States needs in its arsenal as a guaranteed incentive for foreign nations to
recognize and enforce U.S. judgments, this approach sacrifices private
See id. at 234-35.
See Miller, supra note 42, at 300-02.
131. Patrick J. Borchers, Proceedingsof the 77th Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, 77
A.L.I. PROC. 223 (2000).
132. Miller, supra note 42, at 300.
133. See id.
129.
130.

March 2008]

PRESERVING POWER

litigants' rights for a public interest-the recognition and enforcement of
U.S. judgments globally.'" Criticism of this effect rests in the assumption
that public law and private international law are distinct spheres.' 35 This
assumption has been gradually weakened by the increasing
"interconnectedness of private international law and international
affairs" and its recognition by courts, which now address a growing
number of transnational disputes."36 That the fine line between public and
private international law is blurred, however, should not justify depleting
private litigants' rights to recover under favorable judgments. As one
scholar has summarized succinctly: "Fairness demands that the interests
of private parties seeking to enforce foreign law not be held hostage to
the government's interest in promoting reciprocity."' 37 U.S. public
interest in enhancing international commerce, promoting international
cooperation, and obtaining leverage against foreign nations-albeit
compelling-should not be strengthened to the complete detriment of
the individual litigant's right to justice.
A second approach to revising the Proposed Act's reciprocity
provision could induce foreign nations to recognize and enforce U.S.
judgments, not by force, but by example. A federal statute, without a
reciprocity requirement, would perhaps provide the level of
predictability foreign nations need to more willingly recognize and
enforce U.S. judgments.' 3s The recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments is currently reserved as an issue of state law. When deciding
whether to recognize and enforce U.S. judgments, foreign nations must
undertake the complicated task of deciphering the recognition law of the
state which rendered the judgment. That at least eight states,
Massachusetts, Texas, Georgia, Ohio, Idaho, North Carolina, Florida and
Maine, have adopted reciprocity as either a discretionary or mandatory
ground for non-recognition only adds to the complexity of this task.'39
Establishing a bright-line reciprocity defense creates two additional
problems. First, scholars argue that the United States and foreign nations
which require reciprocity as a precondition to recognition will be trapped
in a vicious cycle.'4 ° Essentially, the circular problem of renvoi'4 would

134. See Louisa

B. Childs, Shaky Foundations: Criticism on Reciprocity and the Distinction

Between Publicand Private InternationalLaw, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
135. See id. at 230.

POL. 221, 227 (2005).

136. Id. at 269.
137. Dodge, supra note 128, at 230. Dodge emphasizes, though, that fairness justifies a distinction
between public and private plaintiffs, not public and private law. Id. That is, private parties, regardless
of whether they bring a private or public law claim, must remedy the harm they suffered without the
power to negotiate enforcement with a foreign jurisdiction; public parties, on the otherhand, are in the
position to negotiate with foreign jurisdictions. Id. at 231.
138. See Brand, supra note 43, at 300.
139. See id. at 277.
140. See Miller, supra note 42, at 316.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:943

arise, where both the United States and the foreign nation would refuse
to recognize one another's judgments for failure to reciprocate.
Moreover, even though the ALI asserts that the Proposed Act would
satisfy a foreign nation's requirement that proof of reciprocal treatment
be presented before recognition is permitted, 42 foreign nations have no
obligation to43 treat the Proposed Act as sufficient to fulfill this
requirement. 1
Second, even those foreign nations which do not require reciprocity
as a precondition to recognition might resent the United States' attempt
to force foreign nations to recognize U.S. judgments, and
consequentially, they might choose not to succumb to pressure imposed
by the United States. Alternatively, those foreign nations might simply
ignore the Proposed Act's reciprocity requirement in determining
whether to recognize and enforce U.S. judgments. Just as the Proposed
Act includes various defenses to recognition aside from reciprocity, so do
the laws of foreign nations. A foreign court might choose not to
recognize a U.S. judgment because the judgment violates the foreign
nation's standards in regards to personal jurisdiction, notice, or public
policy, for example. In other words, the United States' threat not to
recognize a foreign judgment might not have any impact on a foreign
nation's decision on whether to recognize a U.S. judgment.
The Proposed Act, absent a reciprocity requirement, would avoid
creating problems of hostility and confusion among foreign nations.
Foreign nations would not be forced to muddle through state statutes
and case law to decipher individual states' law on recognition, nor would
the United States present a confrontational approach to recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. Simultaneously, the Proposed Act
would still permit U.S. courts to refuse recognition and enforcement.
Indeed, section 5 of the act delineates both mandatory and discretionary
defenses to recognition. Mandatory grounds for non-recognition are that:
(i) the foreign judgment is "rendered under a system.., that does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with fundamental
principles of fairness"; (2) the foreign judgment is "rendered in
circumstances that raise substantial and justifiable doubt about the
integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment in
question"; (3) the basis for jurisdiction is unacceptable under section 6;
(4) the defendant does not receive reasonable notice; (5) the judgment is
obtained by fraud; (6) the judgment is repugnant to the public policy of
the United States or a particular state of the United States where the
relevant issue is governed by state law; or (7) the foreign judgment
141. See Ballard, supra 123, at 229-30.
142. See PROPOSED AcT, supra note 21, § 7 cmt. e.
143. See Miller, supra note 42, at 316-17.
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"result[s] from a proceeding undertaken contrary to an agreement under
which the dispute was to be determined exclusively in another forum,"
with some exceptions to this last rule.'" The Act's decision to treat the
fourth, fifth and sixth defenses as mandatory is a departure from the
Recognition Act, in which these defenses are only discretionary.'45
Accordingly, the discretionary grounds for non-recognition under the
Proposed Act have also been altered as compared to the Recognition
Act. The Proposed Act permits a court to consider the following
discretionary defenses to recognition: (i) the rendering court lacks
prescriptive or subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the judgment conflicts with
another foreign judgment entitled to recognition or enforcement under
the Proposed Act which involves the same parties; (3) a U.S. proceeding
on the same subject matter involving the same parties commenced before
the foreign proceeding and the U.S. proceeding was not stayed or
dismissed; or (4) the proceeding was intended to interfere with
adjudicating the claim in "a more appropriate court in the United
States.""46
A critical difference between these discretionary defenses and the
discretionary factors a judge may consider in determining whether
reciprocity exists is that the former are predictable, while the latter are
not. Presumably, a judgment creditor and the foreign court in which he
or she brings a lawsuit would know whether that court has subject matter
jurisdiction and whether the court's judgment would conflict with
another final judgment. Moreover, the judgment creditor would know
whether another party commenced a U.S. proceeding on the same claim
or would have, in fact, commenced the U.S. lawsuit him or herself.
Accordingly, the judgment creditor would also know whether the
proceeding was intended to interfere with adjudicating the claim in a
U.S. court. While the discretionary nature of these defenses creates some
uncertainty for a foreign nation as to whether a U.S. court will refuse to
recognize and enforce judgments rendered in its courts based on any of
these defenses, their existence is certain. The discretionary nature of the
reciprocity defense, however, creates uncertainty both as to whether the
reciprocity defense actually exists and, then, whether a U.S. court will
refuse recognition and enforcement for lack of reciprocity. A judgment
debtor has discretion whether to raise a reciprocity defense in the first
place, and a U.S. court has discretion as to which factors to consider and
how to define the scope of "comparable judgments." A second
distinction between the discretionary defenses in section 5 and the
reciprocity defense in section 7 is that the former defenses are directly

144. PROPOSED AcT, supra note 21, § 5(a)(i)-(vi), 5(b)(i).
145. See UNIF. FOREIGN-Country MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AcT, supra note 20, § 4(b)-(c).
146. PROPOSED Acr, supra note 21, § 5(c)(i)-(iv).
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correlated to the case in which any of the defenses are raised. In contrast,
the reciprocity defense may be invoked even if no procedural or
substantive deficiency exists with the foreign judgment. As one
commentator has stated, a reciprocity defense would create an "inherent
unfairness of punishing
litigants for national policies over which they
47
have no control.'
In light of the various defenses to recognition available under the
Proposed Act, a court would not be forced to recognize and enforce a
foreign judgment even if the reciprocity defense were unavailable. A
foreign nation, likewise, would not be forced to recognize and enforce a
U.S. judgment in comparable circumstances. Instead, the Proposed Act's
defenses would provide uniform standards by which foreign nations
could compare their own judicial proceedings to determine whether a
U.S. court would recognize and enforce their judgments. In turn, this
predictability might lead to foreign nations' greater willingness to
recognize and enforce U.S. judgments.
C.

COMBINING RECIPROCITY AND NON-RECIPROCITY

The ALI's Proposed Act has the potential to move one step towards
a seemingly impossible goal -encouraging
the recognition and
enforcement of U.S. judgments to preserve an individual's right to
judicial remedies. Section I0 of the Proposed Act may be a catalyst
towards accomplishing this goal. In response to a 2002 version of the
Proposed Act, which included a registration process but did not make the
process contingent upon reciprocity, one commentator suggested
enacting a reciprocity requirement with respect to registered judgments
as a compromise between a "full-blown reciprocity repuirement" and the
fairness concerns vocalized by critics of reciprocity. 4 Section I0 of the
Proposed Act now states that
a foreign judgment issued by the court of a state that has entered into
an agreement with the United States for reciprocal recognition of
judgments pursuant to § 7(e) of this Act may be registered in
accordance with this section in any United States court for a district in
which the judgment debtor has property when the debtor (if an
individual) is domiciled in the state or (if a juridical entity) has an
establishment in the state. Alternatively, a judgment may be registered
in any United States court for a district in which the judgment debtor
has substantial assets.... This section authorizes registration only of
money judgments[.] 49
The ALI Reporters originally proposed the requirement that a
foreign nation must enter into a reciprocal agreement with the United

147. Miller, supra note 42, at 299.

148. Danford, supra note 68, at 423.
149. PROPOSED Acr, supra note 21, § Io(a).
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States to invoke the registration process in the ALI's 2004 Tentative
Draft No. 2. '° This proposed requirement was designed "[i]n response to
discussion about whether registration is appropriate in the foreignjudgment context. '15. As the registration process is only available for
those judgments rendered in foreign nations which enter into reciprocal
agreements with the United States, the ALI Reporters intended "the
availability of registration ... [to] 52serve as an incentive to foreign states
to enter into such an agreement.'
However, the potential of utilizing the reciprocity requirement as
leverage to induce foreign nations to enter these agreements is weakened
by the reciprocity defenses in section 7. As section 7 gives a foreign
nation two options, entering a reciprocal agreement with the United
States or awaiting whether a judgment debtor can successfully prove lack
of reciprocity, section 7 provides minimal, if any, incentive for a foreign
nation to enter into a reciprocal agreement. As discussed in section IV.B,
a foreign nation is more likely to choose the latter option; that is, to
impose a burden on the judgment debtor to establish lack of reciprocity.
Consequently, a foreign nation must balance the registration incentive
directly against the case-by-case reciprocity defense to determine
whether to enter into a reciprocal agreement with the United States. If a
foreign court perceives the benefits of registration as outweighing the
burden imposed by a U.S. court failing to recognize the foreign court's
judgments on a case-by-case basis, a foreign nation might be induced to
enter into a reciprocal agreement with the United States. However, if the
balance is essentially even, or the benefits of registration weigh only
slightly more heavily, the enticing effect sought by the ALl Reporters
might not be achieved.
The United States may be much more successful in encouraging the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments abroad, while
respecting the fairness concerns vocalized by critics of the reciprocity
defense, by preserving a bright-line reciprocity agreement requirement
to registration in section io and eliminating the reciprocity defense in
section 7. This approach has been relied upon by two of the United
States' major trading partners, England and Canada, for the recognition
and enforcement of foreign money-judgments.'5 3 Under the laws of both
foreign nations, a U.S. money-judgment is never automatically precluded
recognition and enforcement simply on the grounds of lack of
reciprocity. A litigant seeking to enforce a U.S. money-judgment is
prohibited from seeking recognition only through an expedited route
150.
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absent a reciprocal agreement with England or Canada. As the United
States lacks any such agreements, a litigant may not pursue the expedited
route. However, he or she may still bring a cause of action to enforce the
judgment under the foreign nation's common law.'54
This approach to inducing foreign nations to enter into reciprocal
agreements with the United States seems to rest upon the assumption
that the political processes in those nations will act as the catalysts for
inducement. For example, assume that foreign nation X has declined to
enter into a reciprocal agreement with the United States. Citizens from
nation X forced to pursue a cause of action route for recognition and
enforcement of a favorable judgment, rather than an expedited route,
might vocalize their frustration to nation X's governmental heads.
Individuals who are not citizens of nation X, but who nevertheless
entered into business transactions with companies incorporated in nation
X which maintain the majority of their assets in the United States, might
be discouraged from engaging in further transactions where nation X has
not entered into a reciprocal agreement with the United States, since the
enforcement process will not be simplified and expedited through
registration in the United States.
To account for the possibility that foreign nations might choose not
to recognize and enforce U.S. judgments because those judgments stand
contrary to public policy of foreign nations, section io should permit
foreign nations to enter reciprocal arrangements which do not bar them
from denying recognition and enforcement due to public policy concerns.
The language of section 7(d) would adequately provide such permission,
stating that "[d]enial by courts of the state of origin of enforcement of
judgments for punitive, exemplary, or multiple damages shall not be
regarded as denial of reciprocal enforcement of judgments for the
purposes of this section if the courts of the state of origin would enforce
the compensatory portion of such judgments."'55 By relieving a foreign
nation from recognizing and enforcing a U.S. judgment for punitive,
exemplary or multiple damages, the Proposed Act will likely eliminate a
foreign nation's major apprehension to enter a reciprocal agreement with
the United States. While the incentives created by a registration process
will not guarantee that foreign nations will be induced to enter reciprocal
agreements, the expedited route/cause of action dichotomy does provide
a subtle, yet significant distinction in levels of burden that might be just
enough to sway some foreign nations to enter reciprocal agreements.
The ALI will accomplish three critical objectives by removing the
unpredictable reciprocity defense presented in section 7 and preserving
the bright-line reciprocity agreement requirement to registration in
154. See id.
155. PROPOSED Acr, supra note 21, § 7(d) (emphasis added).
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section io. First, the Proposed Act will not unduly burden private
litigants, foreign and U.S. citizens alike, with the cost and time
expenditures in re-litigating claims. The principles of res judicata and
fairness will thus be preserved. Second, judgment debtors will still be
held liable by the foreign judgments since judgment creditors will be
permitted, regardless of whether reciprocity exists, to bring an
enforcement action.': Third, the United States will communicate to
foreign nations a cogent, unified approach to recognition and
enforcement. Foreign nations, individuals, and businesses will be spared
the complexities and confusion in deciphering the laws of fifty different
jurisdictions and may be, even if only slightly, induced to enter reciprocal
agreements with the United States.
CONCLUSION

A favorable judgment is meaningless without a mechanism to
enforce the judgment in a nation in which the judgment debtor, or the
judgment debtor's assets, resides. Just as a private litigant may suffer loss
from a breach of contract if he cannot recover damages in another
country, he may too suffer human rights violations without receiving
damages as a torturer escapes liability if judgments are not enforced
abroad. In the twenty-first century, where transportation and
information technologies allow individuals and corporations to transcend
national borders, implementation of justice depends upon the universal
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Although the world's
sovereignties have the right to deny enforcement of a foreign judgment
based on different notions of justice, private litigants should not be
punished by a reciprocity defense having nothing to do with the
judgment in question. While it is difficult to determine the extent to
which the uncertainty inherent in the current American recognition and
enforcement regime is creating problems in enforcing judgments and,
indirectly, commerce between the United States and foreign nations,
professor and ALI Reporter Linda Silberman notes that "[m]any
countries are quite restrictive when it comes to respecting foreign
judgments, and some countries are particularly hostile to recognition or
enforcement of U.S. judgments. '
The ALI's Proposed Act presents the United States with a critical
opportunity to share a unified notion of justice with the world, and
thereby induce the recognition and enforcement of American judgments,
without belittling those of other nations. The Proposed Act should not
156. See Miller, supra note 42, at 302 (arguing that the reciprocity provision included in the ALI's
Tentative Draft, dated April 14, 2003, would "unfairly grant judgment debtors a second bite at the
apple and allow them to escape the consequences of their choice to do business or pursue litigation in
a certain jurisdiction").
157. Silberman, supra note 87, at 1435.
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include a reciprocity defense in section 7, but it should continue to
mandate that foreign nations enter reciprocal agreements with the
United States to benefit from the Proposed Act's registration process of
section io, through which a foreign judgment is treated as a U.S.
judgment for purposes of immediate enforcement. By enacting this
revised version of the Proposed Act, Congress can seize this moment to
create an effective reciprocity regime while sharing a unified method for
achieving justice with the world.

